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Article 4

PRISONERS OF FATE: THE CHALLENGES OF CREATING
CHANGE FOR CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS
AMY B. CYPHERT*
ABSTRACT
Children of incarcerated parents, the invisible victims of mass
incarceration, suffer tremendous physical, psychological, educational, and financial burdens—detrimental consequences that can
continue even long after a parent has been released. Although
these children are blameless, policy makers, judges, and prison officials in charge of visitation policies have largely overlooked
them. The United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual explicitly instructs judges to ignore children when fashioning
their parents’ sentences, and judges have largely hewed to this policy, even in the wake of the 2005 United States v. Booker decision
that made those Guidelines merely advisory, not mandatory. Although some scholars have suggested amending the Guidelines or
making other legislative changes that would bring children’s interests forward at the sentencing phase, these suggestions are less
likely than ever to bear fruit. In light of the Trump Administration’s “tough on crime” rhetoric, new Attorney General Jefferson
Sessions’ “law and order” reputation, and Republican control of
the House and Senate, policy change that is viewed as “progressive” is highly unlikely. Therefore, this Article proposes two other
avenues for change. First, in a new and unique proposal, this Article suggests federal judges can and should independently order
the inclusion of Family Impact Statements into a defendant’s
presentence investigation report via a heretofore largely unused
“catchall provision” of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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Second, this Article makes three modest policy recommendations
that are aimed at improving the ability of children to visit their
incarcerated parents. Visitation has been shown in studies to be a
powerful tool of mitigation for many of the harms children experience when their parents are incarcerated, but visitation rates are
woefully low. The options for improving circumstances for children of incarcerated parents may well be limited, but there are viable options, and there is no time to waste.
“We agree with the sentencing judge that a child will bear a
stigma from being born in prison. But it has been recognized since
time immemorial that the sins of parents are visited upon their children.”1
INTRODUCTION
In April of 2016, the Annie E. Casey Foundation released a policy report
that detailed in bleak terms the devastating impact that parental incarceration
has on the children who are left behind.2 Too little attention has been paid to
these children and the effect their parent’s incarceration has on them. Scholars have termed them “collateral damage”3 and “invisible victims,”4 and
noted that the high price they pay in terms of their altered trajectories is the
“hidden cost[] of our criminal justice policies.”5 As the Annie E. Casey
Foundation report noted, “policy debates about incarceration rarely focus on
1. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990).
2. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., A SHARED SENTENCE: THE DEVASTATING TOLL OF PARENTAL
INCARCERATION ON KIDS, FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 1–7 (2016), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-asharedsentence-2016.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Roy L. Austin Jr. & Karol Mason, Empowering Our Young People, and Stemming
the Collateral Damage of Incarceration, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Oct. 8,
2014, 7:30 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/10/08/empowering-our-youngpeople-and-stemming-collateral-damage-incarceration; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1005, 1015 (2001) (“One of the most serious collateral harms imposed by massive incarceration is
the negative impact on children with parents in prison.”).
4. Michal Gilad & Tal Gat, U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution
for Children of Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 372 (2013) (noting
“[t]wo-thirds of incarcerated women have minor children, and as many as seventy to ninety percent
of incarcerated mothers are the sole caregivers for their children” and asking, “Where do all these
invisible victims of crime go when deprived of their primary or sole caregiver?” (footnote omitted)
(first citing BARBARA BLOOM, BARBARA OWEN & STEPHANIE COVINGTON, NAT’L INST. OF
CORR., GENDER RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
WOMEN OFFENDERS 7 (2003); and then citing Jordana Hart, Bill Lets Mothers in Prison Keep Tots:
Benefits to Parent and Child are Cited, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1997, at B1)).
5. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FAMILIES LEFT BEHIND: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 1 (2005), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/310882-Families-Left-Behind.PDF.
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the burden borne by children and families” when a parent is incarcerated.6
But a burden is indeed borne. These blameless children, who have done
nothing wrong, nonetheless will “do the time” with their parents, and will
likely experience a myriad of negative impacts. As the quote from the Pozzy
case illustrates, sentencing judges have largely accepted as a given, reluctantly or not, that these children are to be punished alongside their parents.
But is there another way? Is it simply inevitable that, when a parent has
engaged in criminal behavior, their children must necessarily suffer? Are
there any low-cost, politically-feasible ways to mitigate this suffering? This
Article endeavors to examine the viability of a variety of proposals that might
help children of incarcerated parents, and concludes that, although the path
forward to assisting them is narrow, it does exist.
Part I lays out in stark detail the extremely difficult situation that children of incarcerated parents experience, outlining the real harms they face—
everything from decreases in their physical and psychological health to an
increased risk for homelessness and educational failures. These problems
follow children into adulthood, setting them up for an increased risk of problems such as drug use, unemployment, and, ultimately, incarceration themselves. In addition, children of incarcerated parents are disproportionately
black and living in poverty, mirroring larger trends in the administration of
criminal justice in this country. Part I will also explore the reasons that something shown in studies to mitigate so many of those harms—visitation with
their parents—is so difficult to achieve in practice, despite the fact that visitation also reduces recidivism rates for incarcerated parents. Although this
Article focuses chiefly on federal sentencing practices and rules, and therefore on children of parents incarcerated in federal prisons, the harms that children experience when a parent is incarcerated extend, of course, to state and
local jails as well.
These harms, while relatively well documented by researchers, are
nonetheless noticeably absent from sentencing decisions and the case law
surrounding incarceration. To help explain why this is, the Article shifts in
Part II to a discussion of the federal criminal sentencing process, and how,
traditionally, children have been left out of the conversation when a parent is
facing jail time. Part II gives a brief history of the Sentencing Guidelines,
including a discussion of Guidelines Section 5H1.6,7 which explicitly instructs sentencing judges that the impact of a parent’s incarceration on minor
children or other family members is generally not to be considered when
fashioning a sentence. Part II also discusses the Supreme Court’s 2005
United States v. Booker8 decision, which, along with the vacillating opinions
6. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2.
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
8. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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that have come after it, made the Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory,
thus freeing federal judges from blindly following them when sentencing a
parent. However, Booker and its progeny have largely not lived up to their
revolutionary potential with respect to taking family impact into consideration at sentencing. District court judges have taken an uneven approach to
downward departures on the basis of family responsibilities when sentencing
parents in the wake of the Booker decision, and this Article examines that
phenomenon and the various reasons for it. Part II concludes by discussing
the fact that the Bureau of Prisons, not sentencing judges, decide where federal inmates are incarcerated, and subsequently, this decision has a massive
impact on a child’s ability to visit their parent in prison.
Part III examines proposed legislative and judicial changes that are relatively feasible in terms of cost and would have a major impact on children
of incarcerated parents, but are nonetheless unlikely to come to fruition under
the Trump Administration and current Attorney General Sessions. Ultimately, recommendations that would require action on the part of Congress—such as amending the Sentencing Guidelines to clarify that family responsibilities can be considered in fashioning a sentence or amending Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to mandate the inclusion of Family Impact
Statements in presentence investigation reports—are not, at the present,
likely to occur. Similarly, it is unlikely action on the part of the Supreme
Court—such as directing sentencing judges to ignore the portion of the Sentencing Guidelines that disfavors consideration of family responsibilities in
sentence formation—would occur.
But the news is not all bleak: the heart of this Article is Part IV, which
makes two sets of recommendations aimed at addressing the issues facing
children of incarcerated parents that are likely to succeed, even if on a patchwork basis. First, Part IV explores a novel action that individual federal sentencing judges can take—by using a relatively underutilized provision of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 32(d)(2)(G))—to require that a
presentence investigation report include information about how a parent’s incarceration will impact their minor children. This recommendation is unique
to this Article; research did not yield evidence of a single instance of a judge
using this Rule to require a Family Impact Statement. But a recent opinion
out of the Eastern District of New York, where that provision was used to
require an assessment of collateral consequences as part of the sentencing
report, provides a useful roadmap of how it could be used here.9 Second, Part
IV outlines three recommendations for improving prison visitation policies:
(1) making them explicitly welcoming to children; (2) increasing visiting
hours; and (3) working with nonprofits to help overcome financial obstacles
to visitation for children of incarcerated parents. These three policy changes
9. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

2018]

PRISONERS OF FATE

389

are modest, can be implemented with relatively low cost, and are already occurring in certain jurisdictions around the country.
Children of incarcerated parents have never had an easy lot. There is
little reason to believe that there will be significant legislation aimed at improving their experiences anytime in the foreseeable future. But there are
things that can be done by concerned judges, compassionate prison officials,
and even everyday citizens willing to support nonprofit work. Efforts to help
protect and foster these invisible victims are timely and essential.
I. DEFINING THE ISSUE AND THE STAKES
As prison populations have ballooned in recent decades (the United
States now has the world’s highest incarceration rate),10 so too have the rates
of parental incarceration. “From 1980 to 2000, the number of kids with a
father in prison or jail rose by 500 percent.”11 The problem of parental incarceration is a shockingly pervasive issue. In the state of Kentucky, for example, thirteen percent of all children have a parent who was or is incarcerated.12
A full sixty-three percent of federal prisoners are the parents of minor children, and nearly half lived with their children prior to being sent to prison,
suggesting that many of them were actively involved in their children’s lives
prior to their incarceration.13 Conservative estimates place the number of
children who have had a parent in jail or prison at some point in their lives at
around 5.1 million.14
As with so many problems that involve incarceration in this country, the
issue is one that disproportionately impacts communities of color, with black
children 7.5 times more likely and Hispanic children 2.6 times more likely
than white children to have a parent in prison.15 The numbers are stark: for
a black child born in 1990, there is a one in four chance their father was incarcerated before the child’s fourteenth birthday, a chance that doubles to one
in two if the father never completed high school.16
Incarceration is also a problem that disproportionately impacts children
living in poverty. Children of incarcerated parents are more likely than other
10. ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLL. LONDON INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD
PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), http://www.apcca.org/uploads/8th_Edition_2009.pdf.
The United States now imprisons 756 per every 100,000 people, more than Russia (629 per
100,000), Rwanda (604 per 100,000) and Cuba (531 per 100,000). Id.
11. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 1.
12. Id.
13. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: PARENTS IN PRISON 1–2 (2012),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/parents-in-prison/.
14. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2.
15. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 1.
16. Angelia Cai, Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk, 26 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 91, 93 (2014).
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children to live in low-income communities with poor-quality housing and
underperforming schools.17 The high rate of incarceration in these neighborhoods promotes a vicious cycle that is hard for communities to climb out of:
“The sheer number of absent people depletes available workers and providers, while constraining the entire community’s access to opportunity—including individuals who have never been incarcerated.”18 Even when parents
are released from prison and return to their families and communities, their
criminal records can severely reduce their ability to find housing and steady
employment, further destabilizing their children.19 For example, former inmates may be barred from employment opportunities by criminal record disclosure requirements or from housing by blanket bans or policies.20
A. The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children
While it is perhaps a very obvious conclusion to draw, it is nonetheless
an important statement to make: having a parent who is incarcerated can negatively impact all aspects of a child’s wellbeing and development, including
their emotional, psychological, and educational development and their physical and financial wellbeing. The collateral consequences that parental incarceration can impose on children are broad, vast, and nearly universally negative. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that not all family separation
due to incarceration is negative for children. Where an incarcerated parent
was abusive, for example, their absence may improve a child’s situation, at
least temporarily. “But more typically, the separation due to imprisonment
has a negative impact on the family.”21
Although too little attention has been paid to examining the tolls of incarceration and parental separation on children of incarcerated parents, the
research to date confirms what is intuitive: having a parent in prison is a
hugely destabilizing event in a child’s life. Researchers have concluded that
17. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 4 (citing MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL
LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION (2014), https://www.cbpp.org/research/changing-priorities-state-criminal-justice-reforms-and-investments-in-education).
18. Id.
19. Id. (noting that a lack of training and work experience combined with low levels of educational attainment and a requirement of disclosing a criminal record bar many formerly incarcerated
people from gainful employment, and that even in public housing there sometimes exist blanket
bans on people with criminal records).
20. See Ofira Schwartz-Soicher et al., The Effect of Paternal Incarceration on Material Hardship, 85 SOC. SERV. REV. 447, 449 (2011) (noting “incarceration both substantially and statistically
significantly reduces fathers’ financial contributions to their families, destabilizes family relationships, and hinders men’s postincarceration labor-market performance,” and “families of men with
an incarceration history may face difﬁculties in ﬁnding housing because landlords may be reluctant
to rent to such families if they ﬁnd out that the fathers have a criminal record”).
21. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
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having an incarcerated parent can traumatize a child in the same way that
abuse and domestic violence do, and with the same lasting negative impact.22
Unlike those other forms of loss, the impact of parental separation due to
parental incarceration has been relatively underexplored.23 What we do
know, however, is startling.
Children with an incarcerated parent are more likely to face a range of
health issues, from asthma and obesity24 to depression and anxiety.25 The
data is especially striking for very young children (“[m]ore than 15 percent
of children with parents in federal prison . . . are 4 or younger”)26 and for
children whose mothers are incarcerated. For these children, we know that
the disruption of parental attachment27 caused by parental incarceration can
sharply increase rates of depression and anxiety and severely disrupt a child’s
educational performance.28 Older children do not escape unscathed and still
face serious negative impacts when a parent is incarcerated. For example,
researchers have concluded that when parents are incarcerated during their
children’s adolescence, this separation “interrupts key developmental tasks”
during the time “when parent-child relations strongly influence issues of
identity.”29

22. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3.
23. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (“[T]here has been little research exploring these consequences of parental incarceration. The broader phenomenon of parental separation and loss, particularly in the context of divorce or death, has, by contrast, received substantial research attention.”).
24. The argument is not, of course, that children automatically develop asthma or obesity as a
result of having an incarcerated parent. There are, no doubt, issues of correlation as opposed to
causation with respect to these negative physical impacts of incarceration. Those ailments tend to
occur more in children living in poverty, and as has already been discussed, children living in poverty are disproportionately impacted by parental incarceration to begin with, and further, parental
incarceration almost always results in a worsening of a family’s financial situation. See, e.g., Cindy
Dell Clark, Breathing Poorly: Childhood Asthma and Poverty, in CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA
TODAY 33, 37 (Barbara A. Arrighi & David J. Maume eds., 2007) (noting that childhood obesity
and asthma are both “pronounced problem[s] for African American inner-city poor children”).
25. Austin & Mason, supra note 3.
26. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 2 (first citing LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M.
MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN (2008),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf; then citing CREASIE FINNEY HAIRSTON, ANNIE E.
CASEY FOUND., FOCUS ON CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH LITERATURE (2007), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-FocusonChildrenwith_ncarceratedParentsOverviewofLiterature-2007.pdf).
27. For more on parental attachment in young children and the impact of incarceration on it,
see generally Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, The Effects of Parental Incarceration on
Children: Perspectives, Promises, and Policies, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF
INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 189, 202–04 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003).
28. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3. Children of incarcerated mothers are at an
especially high risk of dropping out of school. Id.
29. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (citing RICHARD LERNER, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 2002)).
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Sadly, even if a parent is released from prison, these negative impacts
are lasting and haunt children of incarcerated parents through their own adulthoods. Parental imprisonment has consistently been found “to be a strong
risk factor for antisocial behavior, future offending . . . drug abuse, school
failure, and unemployment.”30 Because these children are statistically more
likely to grow up and be incarcerated themselves, the problem of parental
incarceration is a cyclical one that perpetuates “intergenerational patterns of
criminal behavior.”31
As if these negative effects were not enough on their own, they are compounded by the social stigma that children of incarcerated parents may experience, a stigma that is not attached to other forms of family loss or financial
hardship (such as divorce or the death of a parent).32 At a recent listening
session hosted by the Federal Interagency Reentry Council’s Subgroup on
Children of Incarcerated Parents, a young woman “recalled the humiliation
she felt when being called out of class after her mother was arrested and the
shame of having teachers and classmates look at her differently.”33 Like
other negative impacts on children of incarcerated parents, this stigma often
persists even after the parent has been released from prison and reunified with
the family.34
Of course, when a parent is incarcerated, the family also often experiences a financial burden that intensifies the problems listed above. “When
fathers are incarcerated, family income can drop by an average of 22 percent.”35 Even those prisoners who are paid for a prison job earn as little as
30. Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the
Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 31 (2013) (first citing
Joseph Murray & David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME
& JUST. 133, 135 (2008); and then citing Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2004)).
31. Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009) (quoting TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2).
32. Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449 (“The community’s interpretation of the
incarceration and any resulting family hardship might stigmatize mothers in ways that other family
loss does not. Stigmatization may leave these mothers ostracized at the very time when they need
both ﬁnancial and emotional support.” (citations omitted) (first citing Kathryn Edin et al., Fatherhood and Incarceration as Potential Turning Points in the Criminal Careers of Unskilled Men, in
IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 46 (Mary Pattillo et al.
eds., 2004); and then citing Joyce A. Arditti, Families and Incarceration: An Ecological Approach,
86 FAM. IN SOC’Y 251 (2005))).
33. HHS and DOJ Host Listening Session with Youth Who Have an Incarcerated Parent,
YOUTH.GOV (2016), http://youth.gov/feature-article/coip-listening-session-2016.
34. Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449.
35. ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., supra note 2, at 3 (first Citing Rucker C. Johnson, Ever Increasing Levels of Parental Incarceration and the Consequences for Children, in DO PRISONS MAKE US
SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 77 (Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll eds.,
2009); and then citing THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S
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$350.00 per year.36 Indeed, at least one scholar has called for “incarceration
insurance” for children of incarcerated parents: “an upfront subsidy to the
child whose parent goes to prison, to be repaid to the state by the incarcerated
parent on a deferred basis in lieu of child support.”37
The lost parental income is not the only financial factor, as families also
have to deal with court-related fines and fees. Maintaining contact between
the incarcerated parent and the child, although crucial to help mitigate some
of the negative impacts of incarceration (as discussed more fully below), is
also costly. It can be expensive and time-consuming for children of incarcerated parents to visit, especially given that “84% of parents in federal prisons are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence.”38 Even
phone calls, seemingly simple but also critical,39 can be a financial burden:
collect phone calls from inmates cost three times as much as collect calls
placed from a pay phone outside of prison and five times as much as collect
calls placed from residential phones.40 Given the loss of income and rise in
costs associated with parental incarceration, it is no wonder that the rise in
incarceration over the past several decades has been linked with a rise in child
homelessness, which occurs especially among African American children.41
Termination of parental rights is also a very real possibility when parents are incarcerated, and it is little wonder that one out of every five children
entering our child welfare system has an incarcerated parent.42 Each state has
its own statute authorizing the involuntary termination of parental rights, and
“[e]ach state handles termination for imprisoned parents differently, ranging
from states that allow termination based on incarceration for a specified period of time to states that conduct a full-scale critique of the parent-child relationship with incarceration as only one consideration.”43
EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf).
36. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
37. Cai, supra note 16, at 91.
38. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2 (citing CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf).
39. For more on the importance of phone calls for inmates, see Artika Tyner et al., Phone Calls
Creating Lifelines for Prisoners and Their Families: A Retrospective Case Study on the Campaign
for Prison Phone Justice in Minnesota, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 83, 84–85, 89–91 (2015) (noting that
phone calls are associated with positive outcomes for inmates and are especially important where
inmates and/or their friends and family have difficulty communicating via writing).
40. Schwartz-Soicher et al., supra note 20, at 449.
41. Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration, Child Homelessness, and the Invisible
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 75 (2014).
42. Austin & Mason, supra note 3 (noting “[n]early 20% of all children entering the child
welfare system have an incarcerated parent”).
43. Steven Fleischer, Termination of Parental Rights: An Additional Sentence for Incarcerated
Parents, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 312, 312 (1998) (footnote omitted) (first citing COLO. REV. STAT.
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On the federal level, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(“ASFA”)44 is structured to move children from foster care to adoption placements quickly by requiring states begin the process of terminating parental
rights any time a child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the past
twenty-two months.45 These timeframes are especially relevant for incarcerated parents, as “the typical sentence for an incarcerated parent is between 80
and 100 months.”46 One scholar notes that in practical application, the result
of ASFA for children of incarcerated parents is that the law “fails to recognize incarcerated parents as deserving of the same protections as non-incarcerated parents,” and that such an outcome is triggered in part because incarcerated parents are more likely to be poor or members of racial minority
groups.47 The child welfare system disproportionately impacts children of
color, and there is evidence that “racism continues to permeate” the child
welfare system; some scholars have called that system “eerily reminiscent of
the slave codes and Reconstruction, when African-American families had little control over their own composition.”48 Termination of parental rights is,
in many states, a permanent action and, therefore, not remediable even when
a parent is released from prison.49
B. Visitation as Mitigating Factor
Despite these bleak outcomes and statistics, there is a ray of hope for
children of incarcerated parents and the parents themselves, as we know that
visitation is a relatively easy way to mitigate many of the negative outcomes
associated with parental incarceration.

ANN. § 19-3-604 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); and then citing In Re L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 631 A.2d
928 (1993)).
44. Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat. 2118-20 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
45. Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents: Bridging the Divide, 24 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 176 (2012).
46. Id. (first citing STEVE CHRISTIAN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS (2009), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/childrenofincarceratedparents.pdf; and then citing Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts. What State Courts
Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 348–51 (2005)).
47. Id. at 178–79.
48. Shani King, The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 609–
10, 614 (2011) (citing Ralph Ricard Banks, Beyond Colorblindness: Neo-Racialism and the Future
of Race and Law Scholarship, 25 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 41, 42 (2009)).
49. Mitchell, supra note 45, at 178.
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1. Benefits of Visitation
Numerous studies have concluded that frequent and high quality visits
between incarcerated parents and their children are beneficial for both.50 Indeed, one of the two major determinants of child adjustment during the period
of parental incarceration is the child’s opportunities to maintain contact with
the incarcerated parent (the other is the nature and quality of the alternative
caregiving arrangements).51 Although some scholars caution against declaring such visits universally beneficial, noting that much of the research on
prison visitation has focused on the benefit to the incarcerated parent and less
on benefits to their children,52 even these scholars accept visitation as neutral
at worst for children, noting that “[n]o studies have shown that visitation in
prison destroys the benefits [typically associated with] parent/child visitation.”53 The majority of those who have studied the issue have concluded
that where the visitation is of a high quality, it is associated with positive
outcomes for children, and that “maintaining contact with one’s incarcerated
parent appears to be one of the most effective ways to improve a child’s emotional response to the incarceration and reduce the incidence of problematic
behavior.”54
Visits have also been shown to reduce recidivism rates amongst incarcerated parents and improve long-term success upon reentry.55 One relatively
50. See generally Chesa Boudin et al., Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 151‒52 (2013) (providing a summary of visitation policies in federal
prisons and in the fifty states).
51. Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, Effects of Parental Incarceration on Young
Children, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 1, 2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basicreport/effects-parental-incarceration-young-children. This paper was presented at the National Policy Conference, “From Prison to Home: The Effect of Incarceration and Reentry on Children, Families and Communities,” in Washington, D.C.
52. See, e.g., Benjamin Guthrie Stewart, Comment, When Should a Court Order Visitation
Between a Child and an Incarcerated Parent?, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 165, 171–75 (2002)
(noting that despite the lack of research into the impact of children visiting their parents in prison,
most experts conclude such visits are beneficial); see also Rebecca J. Shlafer et al., Introduction
and Literature Review: Is Parent-Child Contact During Parental Incarceration Beneficial?, in
CHILDREN’S CONTACT WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND
INTERVENTION 1, 16 (Julie Poehlmann-Tynan ed., 2015) (describing one researcher as concluding:
“[T]he effects of parent-child contact could not be globally described as good or bad. Rather . . .
such effects depend on variations in the quality of visitation experiences.”).
53. Stewart, supra note 52, at 175.
54. NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., BROKEN BONDS:
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF CHILDREN WITH INCARCERATED PARENTS 10
(2008), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411616-Broken-BondsUnderstanding-and-Addressing-the-Needs-of-Children-with-Incarcerated-Parents.PDF.
55. Id. at 10–11; see also William D. Bales & Daniel P. Mears, Inmate Social Ties and the
Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?, 45 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 287,
304 (2008); TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6 (“Studies comparing the outcomes of prisoners who
maintained family connections during prison through letters and personal visits with those who did
not suggest that maintaining family ties reduces recidivism rates.”).
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recent and large-scale study reviewed the impact of visitation on rates of recidivism among 16,420 offenders released from Minnesota prisons between
2003 and 2007.56 The researchers found that any visit at all reduced the risk
of recidivism by thirteen percent for felony reconvictions and by twenty-five
percent for technical violation revocations.57 Further, more frequent visits
and visits that were timed near the date of the inmate’s release were associated with even greater reductions in recidivism.58 That study also noted that
recent research in Florida and Canada has produced similar results, finding
that visitation is associated with reduced recidivism.59 Because recidivism is
costly to society in multiple ways (in Minnesota, for example, release violators cost the state an average of $9,000 for every return to prison),60 this research suggests that visitation would be a good area of investment for prisons,
a point that is relevant to this Article’s recommendations aimed at improving
prison visitation policies.
2. Barriers to Visitation
Despite these wide-ranging and fairly well-established benefits, fewer
than half of all incarcerated parents are ever visited by their minor children,
and even amongst those who do receive visits, many describe them as “infrequent.”61 While every family and situation is different, the three main barriers to visitation identified by researchers are: (1) financial costs, a hurdle exacerbated, as discussed above, by the fact that these children are more likely
to live in poverty; (2) fear of psychological harm/stigma to children during
visitation; and (3) visitation policies that generally do not consider children’s
unique needs and are sometimes actively hostile to them.
The cost of visitation, from bus fares or gas costs to meals and missed
work for adults, can certainly chill visits from children to their incarcerated
parents. As noted above, children of incarcerated parents often come from
56. Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of Prison
Visitation on Offender Recidivism, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 271, 271 (2013).
57. Id. at 289.
58. Id. Interestingly, the researchers found “not all types of visitation ha[d] a beneficial effect
on recidivism”; visits from ex-spouses, for example, were associated with an increase in recidivism.
Id. at 290. The researchers theorized that those visits may have had more of an impact on recidivism
than other visits in part because, for married inmates, “visits with either spouses or children may be
difficult because they create more stress and are often reminders of how their incarceration is preventing them from raising their children or helping provide for their families.” Id. Visits from
fathers, siblings, clergy, and in-laws were the most important for reducing recidivism. Id.
59. Id. at 276–77.
60. Id. at 291.
61. Keva M. Miller, The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging Need for
Effective Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 472, 476 (2006) (citing Cynthia
Seymour, Children with Parents in Prison: Child Welfare Policy, Program, and Practice Issues, 77
CHILD WELFARE 460 (1998)); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2.
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low-income communities, and a vast majority of parents in federal prisons
are incarcerated more than 100 miles from their last residence.62 Thus, such
a visit can take a day or longer. The ability to bear these costs is of course
exacerbated by the financial strain that parental imprisonment places on families. Even technological advances such as video visitation may not fully
address the financial barriers to visitation, given that this technology is often
prohibitively expensive. Some jurisdictions charge $20.00 for a twenty minute “visit,” for example.63 As one scholar notes, “the fees for online video
visitation run the risk of becoming exploitative” because the unregulated fees
are not tied to the costs of the service but rather are a way for prisons to make
money off of the desire of families to stay in touch with their incarcerated
loved ones.64
Further, incarcerated parents may be reluctant to have their children see
them in prison, and/or the children’s caregivers may worry about the psychological harm of such a visit.65 This fear has even been enshrined in Supreme
Court precedent: “children [who visit inmates in prison] are at risk of seeing
or hearing harmful conduct during visits and must be supervised with special
care in prison visitation facilities.”66 Yet, the Federal Interagency Reentry
Council recently touted its efforts to improve access to video communication
for incarcerated parents because “this technology may give a way for children
to interact with their incarcerated parents without experiencing the stigma
and difficulties of visiting a parent in a correctional facility.”67 As for parents, one group of researchers noted that visits with their children may be a
stark reminder that the incarcerated parent is not able to be fully present for
their child in a traditional way, or to provide for that child.68 Accordingly,
an incarcerated parent may choose to self-restrict visitation with his or her
child in an attempt to shield both of them from pain.
Finally, as will be discussed more fully below, prison visitation policies
also complicate the ability of incarcerated parents to maintain relationships
with their children. Inconvenient visitation hours, lack of parking, visitation
rooms that are not private or child friendly, and rules about who is eligible to
62. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 13, at 2.
63. Patrice A. Fulcher, The Double Edged Sword of Prison Video Visitation: Claiming to Keep
Families Together While Furthering the Aims of the Prison Industrial Complex, 9 FLA. A&M U. L.
REV. 83, 97 (2013). Professor Fulcher also notes that there is reason to be skeptical of video visitation in general, arguing that “caution should be exercised where cost saving measures may lead to
human exploitation.” Id. at 87–88.
64. Id. at 108.
65. Miller, supra note 61, at 476.
66. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129 (2003).
67. THE FED. INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL, A RECORD OF PROGRESS AND A ROADMAP
FOR THE FUTURE 60 (2016), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FIRCReentry-Report.pdf.
68. Duwe & Clark, supra note 56, at 290.
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visit and when visitation can occur, can all deter family members, especially
children, from visiting.69 Ultimately, while visitation is one of the most important protective measures for a child of incarcerated parents, it is highly
underutilized.
II. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: AN INADEQUATE REVOLUTION
Several scholars have argued that one way to combat the very real problems wrought by parental incarceration is through reform of sentencing practices and policies.70 Many have seized upon the Supreme Court’s 2005
United States v. Booker decision and the resulting revolution in sentencing to
argue that such sentencing reform is timely.71 Sentencing reform, and the
associated goal of rethinking the criminal justice system that arrests, prosecutes, and incarcerates so many people to begin with is certainly essential.
However, as this Part demonstrates, sentencing reform is an unlikely vehicle
for improving the experiences of children of incarcerated parents, both because Booker has had a relatively small impact on district court judges’ sentencing practices with respect to their consideration of defendants’ family ties
and also because of mixed messages from appellate courts. This Part will
address the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines, the policy decision
to codify within them a disregard for parental status, and what Booker and
subsequent cases have meant in practical terms for the consideration at sentencing of defendants’ family responsibilities.
A. The Advent of the Sentencing Guidelines
In the mid-1980s, sentencing within the federal court system was wildly
inconsistent, and similarly situated defendants charged with comparable
crimes could and did receive vastly different sentences.72 The disparities
69. Parke & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 51.
70. See, e.g., Emily W. Andersen, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing Family Responsibilities to the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2015) (arguing “the Guidelines
should be amended to indicate that courts can consider family ties and responsibilities when determining a sentence,” and that “Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
amended to require that a family impact assessment be incorporated into each presentence investigation report to provide courts with information about a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities”).
71. See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50
FAM. CT. REV. 228, 228 (2012) (arguing “[s]entencing law is in flux, making this an opportune time
to reconsider whether and to what extent we should take children’s interests into account when
sentencing their parents”).
72. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989).
Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge to determine
what the sentence should be within the customarily wide range so selected. This broad
discretion was further enhanced by the power later granted the judge to suspend the sentence and by the resulting growth of an elaborate probation system. Also, with the advent

2018]

PRISONERS OF FATE

399

were further aggravated by the fact that parole boards could unilaterally release a prisoner early for good behavior.73 Spurred on by public outcry over
this inconsistent sentencing, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,74 which
provided for the creation of a United States Sentencing Commission (“the
Sentencing Commission”) and the promulgation of guidelines for federal
judges (“the Guidelines”) to follow when sentencing defendants.75
The first set of Sentencing Guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 1987, essentially abolished parole and established a series of sentencing ranges that took into account (1) the seriousness of the criminal conduct (referred to as “offense behavior”) and (2) the defendant’s criminal
record (part of the category of “offender characteristics”).76 The Guidelines
were mandatory and federal judges could only “depart” from them (sentencing a defendant to a longer or shorter sentence than that contemplated by the
Guidelines range) if he or she determined that “an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance exist[ed] that was not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.”77
Crucially, Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines provided that “[f]amily ties
and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the guidelines.”78 In adopting Section 5H1.6, the
of parole, Congress moved toward a ‘three-way sharing’ of sentencing responsibility by
granting corrections personnel in the Executive Branch the discretion to release a prisoner
before the expiration of the sentence imposed by the judge. Thus, under the indeterminate-sentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence
within the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment.
Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing
the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.”).
73. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364–65 (describing Executive Branch power to release prisoners
early).
74. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012)).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012).
76. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987).
The statute contains many detailed instructions as to how this determination should be
made, but the most important of them instructs the Commission to create categories of
offense behavior and offender characteristics. An offense behavior category might consist, for example, of ‘bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken.’ An offender
characteristic category might be ‘offender with one prior conviction who was not sentenced to imprisonment.’
Id.
77. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1990 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012)); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367–68 (discussing the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984).
78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987).
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Sentencing Commission was responding to a congressional mandate specifying that it is generally inappropriate for judges to consider family ties and
responsibilities in fashioning an appropriate sentence.79 According to the
legislative history, this Section was adopted in an attempt to address concern
that those with strong community and family ties would otherwise be given
sentences that were too lenient.80 As a former member of the Sentencing
Commission wrote, in an attempt to reduce the sentencing disparities between “white, middle class defendants with strong ties to visibly intact families” and “unemployed, unmarried minority defendants,” Congress decided
the fair solution was to largely ignore family responsibilities in calculating
the Guidelines’ ranges.81
Accordingly, once the Guidelines were in place, federal district court
judges were instructed to depart downward on the basis of a “discouraged
factor . . .only if the factor [was] present to an exceptional degree or in some
other way ma[de] the case different from the ordinary case.”82 Appellate
courts generally held that family ties were only “exceptional” when the defendant was an “irreplaceable” caretaker of children or other elderly or ill
family members.83
B. United States v. Booker and Its Impact (or Lack Thereof)
The Guidelines, and their de-emphasis of parental responsibilities in
fashioning sentences of incarceration, were binding on federal judges from
their introduction in 1987 until 2005, when the Supreme Court in a landmark
decision declared that the Sixth Amendment requires that the Guidelines be
merely advisory.84 In United States v. Booker, the Court held that because
the Guidelines were mandatory and binding, and because departures were not
available “[i]n most cases, as a matter of law,” juries were precluded from

79. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012).
80. Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System:
Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 201 (1994).
81. Id.
82. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
83. United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928, 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the downward
departure for a husband whose wife was ill with cancer and potentially suicidal, where the husband
was the sole source of financial support for the wife and all other family members were deceased or
otherwise unavailable); see also United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 81–83 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing the downward departure for a son who provided approximately twenty hours of care per
week to his elderly parents, noting the presence of alternative sources of care such as other siblings
and nursing homes); United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the
downward departure for a father whose three minor children lived with his ex-wife and had alternative sources of financial support).
84. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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fulfilling their constitutional duty of determining the facts that led to sentencing, denying defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.85 The
Court did not get rid of the Guidelines entirely, but merely made them advisory rather than binding on judges.86 The Court also invalidated Section 3742(e) of the Guidelines, which had required appellate courts to apply
a de novo standard of review to district court departures from the Guidelines,
and made clear that appellate courts should review them only for “reasonableness.”87
Following Booker, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that
seemed to swing back and forth between reinforcing judicial discretion and
reinforcing adherence to the Guidelines. If Booker opened the door to district
court judges exercising more discretion in sentencing decisions, the Court’s
next decision disincentivized them from doing so. In Rita v. United States,88
the Supreme Court gave permission to appellate courts to presume that a sentence within the Guidelines range was a reasonable sentence.89 As Justice
Souter noted in his dissent, the presumption creates a powerful temptation
for trial judges (who are understandably not eager to be overturned) to sentence defendants within the Guidelines range.90
The Court did not stay on the side of Guidelines adherence for long,
though; later that same year, the Court bolstered the ability of district court
judges to exercise discretion. In Gall v. United States,91 the Court clarified
that the rather deferential “abuse-of-discretion” standard was the proper one
for appellate review of the “reasonableness” of district court sentencing decisions.92 In so doing, the Court rejected a rule adopted by several courts of
appeals that required district courts to give “‘proportional’ justifications for
departures from the Guidelines range.”93 Once again, district courts were
given the message that the Guidelines were truly advisory.
The Court seemingly reinforced judicial discretion with its Kimbrough
v. United States94 decision, holding that a sentencing court could outright reject the Guidelines’ policies in fashioning a sentence.95 In that case, the district court had departed downward, in part out of disagreement with the then-

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 233–37.
Id. at 258–60.
Id. at 260–63.
551 U.S. 338 (2007).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 391–92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
552 U.S. 38 (2007).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 46.
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
Id. at 91.
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existing Sentencing Guidelines’ 100-to-1 ratio for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine sentences.96 The sentencing disparity was deeply unpopular;
even as the Court was hearing Kimbrough, the Sentencing Commission itself
had already reversed course on the sentencing disparity between crack and
powder cocaine, and Congress ultimately addressed the disparity through legislative means.97 Because Kimbrough limits the times when a judge can reject the Guidelines’ policies and suggests closer appellate review may be appropriate when courts do so, at least one commentator has suggested that
Kimbrough, “[d]espite [its] pro-discretion holding[], . . . contain[s] language
that encourages fealty to the Guidelines.”98
The Court did ultimately extend to district court judges the ability to
depart from the Guidelines for policy disagreements outside of crack cocaine
guidelines. In Pepper v. United States,99 the Court affirmed a district court’s
downward departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation, despite the existence of a federal statute100 and a Commission policy statement101 disfavoring consideration of such evidence at sentencing.102 However, like Kimbrough, the Pepper decision is mixed on the question of judicial discretion
and Guidelines allegiance: the Court was careful to limit its holding to those
cases where judicial deviation from the Guidelines on the basis of policy disagreements is “appropriate,” without fully defining that term.103
Whatever the intended impact of Booker and subsequent cases on the
balance between sentencing judges’ discretion and Guidelines fealty, many
federal judges in the years since have hewed rather tightly to the Guidelines,

96. Id. at 91–93 (explaining that under Guidelines Section 2D1.1, “a drug trafficker dealing in
crack cocaine is subject to the same sentence as one dealing in 100 times more powder cocaine”).
97. Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent Recommendations to “Strengthen the Guidelines System”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2014).
98. Id. at 1339–40.
99. 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g)(2) (2012) precluded a district court from “impos[ing] a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range except upon a ground that was specifically and affirmatively”
relied upon in the prior sentencing and upheld as a valid ground on appeal, and therefore prohibited
a district court from departing on the basis of anything post-sentence. Section 3742(g)(2) was held
unconstitutional by the Pepper decision. 562 U.S. at 496.
101. Section 5K2.19 provided that “[p]ost-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional,
undertaken by a defendant after imposition of a term of imprisonment for the instant offense are not
an appropriate basis for a downward departure when resentencing the defendant for that offense.”
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.19 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (withdrawn
2012).
102. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 481.
103. Id. at 501 (“[O]ur post-Booker decisions make clear that a district court may in appropriate
cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s views.
That is particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly unconvincing policy
rationales not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.” (citation omitted) (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007))).
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with compliance104 stabilizing at above eighty percent.105 Various theories
for this phenomenon have been suggested, including fear of non-Guidelines
sentences being overturned106 (as predicted by Justice Souter in his dissent in
Rita),107 sentencing judges’ comfort and familiarity with the Guidelines,108
and judicial desire to avoid disparate sentences109 (which, sadly, appears to
be well founded, as the Sentencing Commission itself has reported a widening gap in racial disparities between white and black defendants postBooker).110 Despite repeated rulings from the Supreme Court encouraging
judicial discretion in sentencing,111 as one scholar has noted, “[t]he gravitational pull of the Guidelines appears to be so strong that the change from
mandatory to advisory Guidelines has had little to no impact on the average

104. Compliance is defined as defendants who are sentenced within the applicable advisory
Guidelines range or pursuant to a request from the government for a sentence below the otherwise
applicable advisory Guidelines range.
105. Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti B. Saris,
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressionaltestimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf. But see Ryan W. Scott, InterJudge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 33 (2010) (concluding that five years of data from the District of Massachusetts suggest that judges there did respond to increased discretion in sentencing post-Booker, though acknowledging that the results are
“necessarily tentative” and limited to one single district court).
106. Nancy Gertner, Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing—Real or Imagined?, 28 FED.
SENT’G REP. 165, 165 (2016) (“[I]n jurisdictions with crowded dockets, or where that is the perception, in jurisdictions that suffered from rigorous Guideline enforcement before Booker, the Guidelines are the easy default. . . . [Judges who follow the Guidelines] will appear efficient and . . . will
surely avoid criticism.”).
107. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391–92 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Mark Osler & Judge Mark W. Bennett, A “Holocaust in Slow Motion?” America’s Mass
Incarceration and the Role of Discretion, 7 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 117, 155 (2014).
109. Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1269 (2014).
[The Guidelines] give[] guidance in the one area in which judges are most likely to feel
in need of it. How, after all, does one go about quantifying punishment for crime? Judges
faced with the task are acutely aware of the inevitable subjectivity of the exercise and are
customarily grateful for standards provided by officially anointed experts, even if they
may not always agree with the experts in particular cases.
Id. (citing Federal Sentencing After Booker: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm’n (2012) (statement of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro, Judicial Confererce of the U.S. Comm. on Criminal Law),
https://www.ussc.gov/research/congressional-reports/2012-report-congress-continuing-impactunited-states-v-booker-federal-sentencing
110. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, [PART E: DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING]
REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 1
(2012),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_E.pdf.
111. Admittedly, federal district court judges could be forgiven for seeing seemingly pro-discretion decisions such as Gall as somewhat murky. See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 97, at 1337–40.
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length of federal sentences.”112 For many federal defendants and for others
involved in the federal criminal system, Booker has had a very small impact
indeed.113
C. Post-Booker Section 5H1.6 Decisions
Given the mixed signals sent by the Supreme Court regarding Guidelines allegiance versus judicial discretion, it is perhaps no surprise that courts
post-Booker have not responded uniformly to their enhanced leeway to consider family ties in sentencing decisions. Rather, “[i]nterpretive disparity regarding when and how to apply family ties departures persists.”114 Some
courts have looked to United States Code Section 3553(a)(1),115 which instructs sentencing judges to consider “the history and characteristics of the
defendant” in determining the appropriate sentence, and have concluded that
this language permits consideration of a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities, Section 5H1.6 notwithstanding. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
held that “[i]n the ‘broader appraisal,’ available to district courts after
Booker, courts can justify consideration of family responsibilities, an aspect
of the defendant’s ‘history and characteristics,’ for reasons extending beyond
the Guidelines.”116 Indeed, Justice Stevens appeared to bless this approach
in his concurrence in the Rita decision, noting that while matters such as family ties are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines, it is nonetheless a
“matter[] that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing judge to consider.”117 The
First Circuit has noted that Booker and Kimbrough opened the door for a
judge to “vary from the [Guidelines], disagreeing with details or even major
premises” when determining whether family responsibilities are the proper

112. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases in
Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 521 (2014).
113. Bowman, supra note 109, at 1229–30 (“[F]rom the points of view of federal defendants in
the mass and of the system that processes them from arrest to prison gate, perhaps the most surprising fact about Booker is just how small an effect it has actually had.”)
114. Andersen, supra note 70, at 1524.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012).
116. United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other
grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)
(first citing United States v. Gorsuch, 404 F.3d 543, 548 (1st Cir. 2005); and then citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1) (2012)) (affirming downward departure for defendant mother who was a single parent,
whose fiancé had been murdered while she was pregnant with their child, and was the sole source
of financial support for a minor child).
117. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364–65 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 918–19 (10th Cir. 2005) (characterizing family ties as relevant under the post-Booker § 3553(a)(1) analysis); United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984,
986 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (same).
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basis for a downward departure.118 The Second Circuit has held that Section
5H1.6 is “no more binding on sentencing judges than the calculated Guidelines ranges themselves.”119
Other courts, however, have continued to place substantial weight in
Section 5H1.6. In United States v. Christman,120 the Sixth Circuit overturned
a below-Guidelines sentence for a defendant that had been based, in part, on
his family ties, specifically caring for his elderly mother.121 The court noted
that under Section 5H1.6, a defendant’s family ties were not ordinarily relevant and should only be considered by district courts “in exceptional
cases.”122 The court, acknowledging the existence of Booker but nonetheless
citing to pre-Booker commentary on Section 5H1.6, concluded that the defendant’s care of his mother was simply not irreplaceable.123 The court reasoned that alternative arrangements could generally be made for the care of
children, including foster care, and thus parenthood itself was not a reason to
depart downward. “To say otherwise would be to invite gross sentencing
disparities based solely on whether one has a young child . . . .”124
Other courts have similarly clung to the notion that only “irreplaceable”
caregivers should be granted downward departures, even in a post-Booker
world. In United States v. Lackard,125 the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district
court’s refusal to grant a defendant downward departure to allow him to care
for his son with disabilities because he was not “irreplaceable” as a caregiver.126 Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this “irreplaceable
caregiver” standard was the one in use prior to the Booker decision, it nonetheless reasoned that “the Guidelines are still to be considered in determining
an appropriate sentence,” and ultimately affirmed the district court decision.127

118. United States v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2012) (affirming the downward
departure for a defendant who cared for his wife, who was battling cancer, and a defendant who
provided care for daughter with disabilities).
119. United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 255, 262–63 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2006)) (affirming the below-Guidelines sentence for a
defendant based in part on the impact his deportation would have on his family).
120. 607 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 2010).
121. Id. at 1112.
122. Id. at 1119 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory
cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1995)).
123. Id. at 1120.
124. Id.
125. 549 F. App’x 193 (4th Cir. 2013).
126. Id. at 195–96 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory
cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2012)).
127. Id. at 196 (holding that the defendant had “failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence”).
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Courts trying to sort out the contours of Booker and its progeny have
not even been able to reach a consensus in their treatment of pregnant defendants at sentencing.128 In 2012, a district court in Kentucky affirmed a
magistrate judge’s decision to depart downward and sentence a defendant to
two years of probation, in part because the defendant was two months pregnant.129 Although the district court judge noted that “[t]he explicit references
to [the defendant’s] pregnancy” by the magistrate judge at sentencing gave
him pause, and that he “would have opted for a different, stiffer penalty,”130
he nonetheless affirmed the probation sentence, noting that a court imposing
punishment could properly consider a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities.131 By contrast, the very next year, a district court in Pennsylvania
denied a motion to vacate a sentence that did not grant a departure for the
defendant’s pregnancy.132 In its opinion, the court noted federal courts’ reluctance to grant downward departures where female defendants became
pregnant subsequent to their arrests or convictions, in part because to do so
is to “send[] an obvious message to all female defendants that pregnancy is
‘a way out.’”133 The Court cited to Section 5H1.6, noting that “[p]regnancy
of a female defendant is neither unusual nor extraordinary and is something
that the Bureau of Prisons ‘has had experience in handling.’”134
Ultimately, although family ties are now the third most common reason
for a departure from the Guidelines, family-based departures are still granted
in fewer than ten percent of all cases,135 and courts approach this unevenly
with most judges continuing to faithfully follow the Guidelines.136 Thus,
Section 5H1.6 and its disregard for family ties remain important considerations for many federal judges when fashioning an appropriate sentence. Further, the Sentencing Commission has provided no additional guidance to
judges, nor have they revised Section 5H1.6 since the Booker decision.137

128. See Andersen, supra note 70, at 1524–26.
129. United States v. Chamness, No. 5:11-CR-00054-R, 2012 WL 3109494, at *6–7 (W.D. Ky.
July 31, 2012).
130. Id. at *7.
131. Id. at *6.
132. United States v. McMahill, No. 06-216, 2013 WL 2186981, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2013).
133. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990)).
134. Id. at *4 (quoting Pozzy, 902 F.2d at 138–39).
135. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, TABLE 25: REASONS GIVEN BY SENTENCING COURTS FOR
DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE—FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/Table25.pdf (noting that family ties and responsibilities account for approximately nine
percent of all departures).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 112–113.
137. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. historical note (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) (indicating that § 5H1.6 was last revised in 2004).
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Accordingly, the author of this Article joins others138 in calling for (1) a formal amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines to make clear to sentencing
judges that they can and should consider family ties and responsibilities when
determining a sentence, and (2) a corresponding change to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 to make clear that the presentence investigation report
provided to the sentencing judge should address a defendant’s family responsibilities, if any. Both recommendations are explained more fully in Part III.
In the absence of such amendments, despite the holdings of Booker and
its progeny, “federal sentencing procedures continue to ignore the interplay
between a defendant’s family responsibilities and the impact of sentencing
on a defendant’s family.”139 Therefore, the likelihood that problems of parental incarceration can be addressed through individual sentencing decisions
is unlikely, and the promise of Booker is left unrealized in this area. In any
event, a federal sentencing judge can only control the length of a sentence,
but not other aspects of incarceration such as location and certain conditions
of visitation—both of which can exacerbate problems of parental incarceration.140 As the next Section will detail, if meaningful change regarding a
child’s ability to visit his or her imprisoned parent is to happen, it is much
more likely to come through policies guiding prisons than through sentencing
decisions of judges.
D. The Bureau of Prison’s Role in Incarceration Placement
While much scholarship has been devoted to the Booker decision and
its progeny, the length of parental incarceration is just one factor that impacts
children of incarcerated parents. Children are also potentially harmed when
parents are incarcerated too far away for visitation.141 Once a federal judge
has determined the length of a defendant’s sentence of incarceration, his or
her involvement in the fashioning of the sentence is largely completed and
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) takes over.
Pursuant to title 18, Section 3621 of the United States Code, it is the
BOP that designates where an inmate serves their sentence.142 The BOP’s
138. Andersen, supra note 70, at 1530–32 (“Like the 2010 revisions to the Guidelines that allowed courts to consider characteristics such as age and mental health, revisions to section 5H1.6
can simply indicate that family ties ‘may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.’” (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2014))).
139. Id. at 1503.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 142–143.
141. See supra Part B.1 (explaining the benefits of visitation).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2012) provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The
Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum
standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the
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statutory authority provides it with near absolute discretion to place inmates
in correctional facilities, even if well outside the judicial district where they
were sentenced (and therefore potentially far away from any dependent children), provided that the facility meets “minimum standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau.”143 Although Section 3621 directs the
BOP to consider “any statement by the court that imposed the sentence . . .
recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate,”144 the
BOP is not required to follow a judge’s recommendation regarding placement, even if that judge makes the recommendation to facilitate the maintenance of an inmate’s ties to their children.145 As one court put it when denying an inmate’s request to be transferred to a newly-opened correctional
facility closer to his family, Congress has “expressly given” the BOP, rather
than district court judges, the power to assign where an inmate is imprisoned.146 While the BOP is to consider a judge’s recommendation, “the BOP
is free to reject the recommendation of the sentencing judge.”147
The BOP operates 122 prisons throughout the United States, and contracts with private corporations to operate 11 additional correctional facilities.148 Because the prison network is so massive, and because many of the
prisons are clustered in certain geographic regions and absent in others,149 the
result is that many incarcerated parents are imprisoned hundreds of miles
from their children. According to a 2009 study, eighty-four percent of parents in federal facilities were incarcerated more than 100 miles from their
place of residence at arrest; only about five percent of parents in the federal
system were within fifty miles of their place of residence at arrest.150 This
Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in
which the person was convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable . . . .
Id.
143. Id.
144. § 3621(b)(4)(B).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Jessop, No. 1:04–CR–159 (GLS), 2006 WL 1877143, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006) (noting that under Section 3621(b)(4) “BOP has the exclusive right to
designate the place of confinement, but it has the discretion to consider judicial recommendations
concerning such matters as proximity to family or program participation,” and “the court has no
jurisdiction to supersede the BOP’s authority”).
146. United States v. Leland, No. 1:03–cr–00033–JAW–01, 2012 WL 1207160, at *1 (D. Me.
Apr. 11, 2012) (quoting § 3621(b)).
147. Id. (citing United States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (D. Me. 2007)).
148. Our Locations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2018).
149. For example, there is no federal prison located in the large geographic swath made up of
the contiguous states of Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota. See Our Locations, FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/map.jsp (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
150. SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 8 (2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Incarcerated-Parents-and-Their-Children-Trends-1991-2007.pdf.
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problem is especially exacerbated for incarcerated mothers, as “[w]omen
convicted of federal crimes are particularly likely to be incarcerated far away
from their children, because of the relatively small number of federal prisons
for women.”151 Even if a district court judge were sympathetic to a mother’s
desire to serve her term near her children, it is the BOP who decides where
inmates are placed, and there are very few federal options for incarcerated
women.
III. SHOUTING IN THE WIND: RECOMMENDATIONS UNLIKELY TO COME TO
FRUITION
A. Previous Scholarship Addressing Children of Incarcerated Parents
Scholars have already offered several helpful frameworks for improving
the way that the criminal justice system treats the children of incarcerated
parents, and this Article appreciates and has benefited from these excellent
starting places. However, in light of changed political circumstances as well
as the lessons of time, this Article also candidly acknowledges why these
previous recommendations are unlikely to be successful.
For example, Chesa Boudin has argued that children of incarcerated parents have a constitutional right, grounded in their “First Amendment freedom
of association and their due process liberty interests,” to maintain a relationship with their incarcerated parent.152 Mr. Boudin, himself the son of incarcerated parents,153 who, as an infant, was the subject of a seminal case about
his mother’s right to visitation with him,154 inverts traditional paradigms to
make this argument. The First Amendment argument he makes reframes the
discussion to focus on the child’s right to freedom of association with their
parent, rather than focusing on the incarcerated parent’s rights.155 This inversion of the traditional framework allows advocates (in theory) to sidestep the
daunting Supreme Court precedents that provide essentially no right to visitation for inmates—precedents which culminate in a ruling that “freedom of
association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration.”156 Mr.
Boudin’s due-process-liberty-interest argument posits that the Supreme
151. Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 231 (citing Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a
Post-Booker Federal Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 745–46 (2006)).
152. Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s Constitutional Right to the
Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77, 79 (2011).
153. Jodi Wilgoren, From a Radical Background, A Rhodes Scholar Emerges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
9, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/09/us/from-a-radical-background-a-rhodes-scholaremerges.html.
154. Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F. Supp. 786, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 697 F.2d
288 (2d Cir. 1982).
155. Boudin, supra note 152, at 105–07.
156. Id. at 105 (quoting Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
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Court has recognized a constitutional due process liberty interest in family
integrity.157 “That right, at least as it pertains to children, should not stop at
the prison gate.”158 His arguments are intriguing, but ultimately unlikely to
be persuasive; he himself acknowledges that “[s]ome of the constitutional
arguments put forward here have been rejected or ignored by the Supreme
Court.”159
Several scholars have argued that courts and policy makers should adopt
a family law perspective when sentencing parents or when determining
prison visitation policies. Sarah Abramowicz, for example, has argued that
family law, with its focus on the best interests of children, offers both a rationale for considering children’s interests at sentencing and also a method
for incorporating those interests.160 Professor Abramowicz frames her argument around seizing upon the momentum of Booker and, given that sentencing law is in a time of flux, asserts that now is the time to “bring children’s
experience out from the shadows of family law.”161 She argues that “in every
case where a parent stands to be incarcerated, the court should articulate how
incarceration of the parent is likely to affect his or her child, and balance the
potential harm to the child against competing concerns.”162 Her arguments
are compelling and add an important dimension to the debate, and she herself
acknowledges that she is beginning a conversation rather than providing all
of the answers.163 Further, she also acknowledges that many of the “least
controversial” solutions are ones that are beyond the scope of the judiciary
and need to be implemented by policy makers.164 Unfortunately, for the reasons discussed above in Part II (including a desire to avoid being overturned,
judicial familiarity with the Guidelines, and a desire to avoid disparate sentences), the judiciary does not appear to have “seized” the post-Booker opportunity to revolutionize sentencing with an eye toward the best interests of
children of incarcerated parents.

157. Id. at 109–12.
158. Id. at 111.
159. Id. at 105.
160. Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 229. Professor Abramowicz makes similar arguments regarding the use of family law as a framework for addressing parental incarceration in an earlier
article as well. See Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV.
793, 797 (2011).
161. Abramowicz, supra note 71, at 229.
162. Id. at 235–36.
163. Id. at 236 (“The difficult question that follows is how courts should balance children’s
interests against competing concerns when sentencing parents convicted of crimes. This Article
hopes only to begin that conversation, and to encourage the family law community to engage in it;
it does not purport to definitively resolve the issue.”).
164. Id. (“One of the least controversial approaches—albeit one that would need to be taken up
by legislators and prison administrators, as judges have limited control in the matter—would be to
address prison policies that harm the children of incarcerated parents.”).
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Other scholars have made specific recommendations for rule or policy
changes that need to occur at the federal level. For example, Emily Andersen
argues that the Guidelines themselves should be revised to indicate that, in
some circumstances, “alternative sentences can and should be considered”
for defendants with family responsibilities.165 The question of whether parents should receive a lessened or alternative sentence because of their status
as parents is, of course, a controversial one. Some commentators have argued
that to do so would be to violate principles of equal protection,166 and even
incentivize certain groups of people (namely “irreplaceable caregivers”) to
engage in criminal behavior.167 These are not merely the hypothetical
thoughts of academics; some courts have even gone so far as to suggest that
taking parental status into account in fashioning a custodial sentence might
incentivize some defendants to actually become parents in order to seek more
lenient sentencing. The First Circuit has reasoned that “allow[ing] a departure downward for pregnancy could set a precedent that would have dangerous consequences in the future, sending an obvious message to all female
defendants that pregnancy is ‘a way out.’”168 While this Article agrees that
certain changes should be made to the Guidelines, as is outlined in more detail below, it is important to consider the resistance such a proposal has already received from both scholars and judges, as well as the current political
climate.169
Andersen also argues that there should be a requirement that the presentence investigation reports currently required pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 include a “family impact assessment,” which would
“include information about a defendant’s family and the impact a potential
sentence might have on the family.”170 While this is a laudable goal, it again
165. Andersen, supra note 70, at 1532.
166. Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1147, 1195 (2007) (“Family ties benefits not only impede the accurate and just administration of
criminal penalties, but they can also threaten basic commitments to equality under law.”).
167. Id. at 1199 (“[S]ome family ties benefits can have the unwanted effect of incentivizing
more criminal activity—and more successful criminal activity to boot. To the extent the law effectively signals messages to the public by highlighting that family membership confers special benefits, some family ties benefits would encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises
in the family.”). For a response, see generally Boudin, supra note 152, at 112–14, arguing that “the
idea that some discount in sentencing or access to a child-friendly visiting room would incentivize
crime should be absurd on its face.”
168. United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 139 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Presentence Investigation Report, id. (No. 89-1879)).
169. See, e.g., Laura Litvan & Billy House, GOP Frets over Slow Pace of Congress Early in
Trump Term, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/republicans-fret-over-slow-pace-of-congress-early-in-trumpterm (noting that “Congress is off to a slow start” and that “[t]he Senate is tied up with delays in
confirming President Donald Trump’s cabinet, the House is spending most of its time undoing regulations from the end of the previous president’s term”).
170. Andersen, supra note 70, at 1533–34.
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must be noted that amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
a complicated and time consuming process that involves Congress, the Supreme Court, advisory committees, and public notice and comment.171 Accordingly, reliance on rule change as a method of addressing the challenges
faced by incarcerated parents and their children may be misplaced. Therefore, this Article instead brings a new suggestion to the table, and encourages
federal sentencing judges to make use of a somewhat obscure provision of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to accomplish the same goal.
B. Previous Recommendations Unlikely to Gain Political Traction
Several of the articles discussed above were written under the Obama
Administration, and there was much excitement when President Obama took
office that there would be significant criminal justice reform.172 “More than
any administration in recent history, the Obama White House . . . focused on
a law enforcement mission that might seem antithetical to hard-nosed prosecutors: getting criminal offenders out of jail early and trying to give them the
skills to stay out.”173 The Obama Administration did include the children of
incarcerated parents in the policy reforms it began on the problem of mass
incarceration. In 2013, the White House hosted a “Champions of Change”
event to honor those who work to address the unique obstacles faced by children of incarcerated parents.174 In 2014, the Department of Justice and the
171. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1001 n.16
(2015). This process itself is a rather involved one:
The current rulemaking process under the Rules Enabling Act places primary responsibility for rule development in judicial committees, though all amendments ultimately
are subject to approval by Congress before taking effect. First, the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules (composed of judges, professors, and lawyers) proposes and approves an
amendment to the rules. Next, the proposed revision may be preliminarily reviewed by
the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure. Third, the amendment is circulated
for consideration and comment by the public, and then is returned to the Advisory Committee, which may make further changes. This final draft must again be approved by
both the Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
and is next passed to the United States Judicial Conference. After being accepted by the
Judicial Conference, a proposed amendment is submitted to the Supreme Court. Finally,
after promulgation by the Supreme Court, the new rule becomes effective the following
December 1 unless Congress takes action to alter or reject it.
Id.
172. Of course, policies aimed specifically at children of incarcerated parents are not the only
way for an administration to address the problems faced by children of incarcerated parents: wide
scale criminal justice reform, including addressing racial disparities in prosecutions and the school
to prison pipeline, would no doubt make a real difference for these children. Such broader initiatives
are ultimately outside the scope of this Article, however.
173. Eric Lichtblau, Obama Legacy of Freeing Prisoners May Come Under Trump Siege, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/us/politics/obama-prisoners.html.
174. Cecilia Muñoz, Supporting Children of Incarcerated Parents, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (JUNE
19, 2013, 9:46 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/19/supporting-childrenincarcerated-parents.
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Department of Health and Human Services joined others at the White House
in announcing programming aimed at helping children of incarcerated parents to succeed.175 On June 24, 2016, President Obama announced a series
of measures to help support reentry for those leaving prison, including “the
development of model family strengthening policies that can be adopted by
and implemented in prisons and jails” such as “visiting policies and procedures; visiting room and waiting room environments; parenting and other
programming offered in correctional facilities; [and] family reunification and
reentry planning.”176
As of the time of this Article’s drafting, the year-old Trump Administration has not yet spoken on any of these issues. It should. But most political
observers agree that significant progress on these issues is increasingly unlikely under the Trump Administration, as President Trump came to power
on a “law and order” platform and, at his confirmation hearings, Attorney
General Sessions vowed that “cracking down on drugs, violence, gun crimes
and illegal immigrants would be among his top priorities.”177 There is good
reason to believe he will follow through on those priorities, as they mirror the
goals that he espoused during his many years as a federal prosecutor and senator.178 These priorities, combined with Republican control of Congress,
contribute to the conclusion below that most legislative change in favor of
children of incarcerated parents is unlikely at this time.
1. Revision of the Sentencing Guidelines
As noted above, other scholars have called for a revision of the Sentencing Guidelines,179 and the Sentencing Commission does indeed possess the
statutory authority to propose Guidelines amendments to Congress.180 There

175. Austin & Mason, supra note 3.
176. The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: President Obama Announces
New Actions to Reduce Recidivism and Promote Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (June 24, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2016/06/24/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-reduce-recidivismand.
177. Lichtblau, supra note 173.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 70, at 1532.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2012). This subsection provides in relevant part that the Sentencing
Commission:
may promulgate under subsection (a) of this section and submit to Congress amendments
to the guidelines and modifications to previously submitted amendments that have not
taken effect, including modifications to the effective dates of such amendments. Such an
amendment or modification shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor
and shall take effect on a date specified by the Commission, . . . except to the extent
that . . . amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of Congress.
Id.
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are several forms this revision could take. First, there could be a simple excision of Section 5H1.6 and its language providing that family responsibilities should not ordinarily be relevant in the sentencing process. Second, there
could be an explicit alteration of the language, perhaps one that allowed for
a more nuanced approach and provided specific language regarding dependent minor children. Unfortunately, for the reasons that will be discussed below, these changes are unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Despite their being unlikely, there is historical precedent for such
amendments. In 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended Guidelines Section 5H1.11.181 That provision, which mirrored Section 5H1.6 in important
ways, had discouraged consideration of “[m]ilitary, civic, charitable, or public service,” during the sentencing phase, using the same language as Section
5H1.6 that they were “not ordinarily relevant.”182 The amended language
drafted by the Commission provides that prior “[m]ilitary service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service,
individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present
to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered
by the guidelines.”183 In making this change, the Commission remarked that
“applying this departure standard to consideration of military service is appropriate because such service has been recognized as a traditional mitigating
factor at sentencing.”184 The Commission then cited to a Supreme Court
opinion in support of this statement.185 As noted above, multiple federal appellate courts have recognized the appropriateness of family responsibilities,
including to minor children, as a proper mitigating factor at sentencing.186
Therefore, there is both judicial and historical precedent for an amendment
favoring recognition of family responsibility on the part of the Sentencing
Commission.

181. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 historical note (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2010).
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2009).
183. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5HI.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010); see
also Hessick, supra note 97 at 1363 (suggesting the consideration of military service is limited to
prior service).
184. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL III app. C, amend. 739 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N
2011),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/APPENDIX_C_Vol_III.pdf (citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 43 (2009)).
185. Id. (“Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of
their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines . . . .” (citing Porter, 558 U.S. at
43)).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 2006) overruled on
other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that a single parent
caring for a child, when balanced against other factors, is a proper mitigating factor); United States
v. Prosperi, 686 F.3d 32, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that caring for a spouse battling cancer is a
proper mitigating factor).
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However, there are several reasons to believe that such an amendment
is unlikely to occur. First, the majority of amendments made by the Sentencing Commission since the inception of the Sentencing Guidelines have been
to increase sentence length rather than decrease sentence length by allowing
for more mitigating circumstances.187 The Commission has proposed hundreds of amendments, and “all but a handful” have proposed increases.188
One reason for this may be that the eight member Sentencing Commission
has historically been disproportionately staffed with prosecutors.189 There is,
for example, a legislative mandate that the Attorney General or his designee
sit as ex officio members,190 but no such mandate requires that defense counsel be represented.191 The Sentencing Commission’s membership bias has
caused its recommendations to be called into question: “Because the DOJ has
such influence on the Commission, one is left to wonder whether the Commission’s recommendations about sentencing are entirely neutral.”192
Second, these amendments may be unlikely because the Sentencing
Commission may not believe it has the power to amend Section 5H1.6 due
to 28 U.S.C. § 994(e), which is the underlying legislation providing that
“family ties and responsibilities” are “general[ly] inappropriate”193 to consider when fashioning a sentence. Of course, the Sentencing Commission
could ask Congress to amend that provision.194 It is certainly within the Commission’s power to make such legislative requests of Congress, and there is
187. See Hessick, supra note 97, at 1374 (stating “the guideline amendment process has generally operated as a one-way ratchet to increase sentences”).
188. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 766–67 (2005).
189. See id. at 762–64 (explaining how the Commission member selection process “heavily
tilt[s] toward law enforcement” and noting “[o]f the twenty-three people who ha[d] served as commissioners [by 2005], thirteen were former prosecutors—and that does not include the ex officio
members appointed by the Attorney General. Moreover, for much of the Commission’s existence,
there have been enough former prosecutors on the Commission to form a majority, or close to it, at
any one time.” (footnotes omitted)).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012) (providing that “[t]he Attorney General, or the Attorney General’s designee, shall be an ex officio, nonvoting member of the Commission”).
191. Hessick, supra note 97, at 1375.
192. Id. at 1376.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”). Because the provision
does not address military service, this would not have been an issue when the Commission amended
§ 5H1.11 in 2010, as discussed above.
194. See Hessick, supra note 97, at 1374 (“This is a highly controversial guideline policy. Not
only do a majority of federal judges disagree with the exclusion of family ties as a sentencing consideration, but there are significant negative external consequences associated with incarcerating
parents. In particular, there appear to be a host of negative effects on children related to the separation caused by a parent’s incarceration.” (footnotes omitted) (first citing Julian Abele Cook, Jr.,
Gender and Sentencing: Family Responsibility and Dependent Relationship Factors, 8 FED. SENT’G
REP. 145, 145 (1995); then citing Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A
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again historical precedent for it. For example, as a recent Second Circuit
opinion noted, since the Booker decision, the Sentencing Commission has
made repeated requests to Congress to require both district court and appellate judges to give more weight to the Guidelines.195
Accordingly, the Commission can and does make legislative recommendations to Congress, and amending 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) would be an appropriate one. But this path—the Sentencing Commission seeking amendment of a legislative provision from Congress, Congress following through,
the Commission recommending the appropriate amendment to the Guidelines as a result, and Congress approving the amendment—is extraordinarily
unlikely in the foreseeable future.
2. Applying Pepper v. United States to Section 5H1.6
In light of the Sentencing Commission and/or Congress being unwilling
or unable to amend Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines or the relevant underlying legislation which disfavors consideration of family responsibilities at sentencing, it is worth exploring the likelihood that another branch—the judicial
one—might take on this issue. Individual judges arguably already have the
power to do more to take children into consideration at sentencing. But the
odds that the Supreme Court itself will mandate or even bless such an approach is unlikely.
In theory, the Supreme Court could unilaterally direct sentencing judges
to ignore Section 5H1.6 when fashioning their sentences. This outcome is
Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1199,
1219–20 (1999); then citing Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered
Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 936–37, 939–40, 943 (1993); then citing Patricia M. Wald, “What
About the Kids?”: Parenting Issues in Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 137 (1995); then citing
Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: Equal
Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 201 (1994); and then citing U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULT OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010
THROUGH MARCH 2010, tbl. 13 (2010))).
195. United States v. Pruitt, 813 F.3d 90, 94 n.8 (2d Cir. 2016). In the Pruitt decision, the
Second Circuit affirmed the underlying top of the Guidelines range sentence of the appellant, but
wrote to urge the Sentencing Commission and the Judicial Conference to amend the Statement of
Reasons form included within the statutorily-required form for the entry of criminal judgments. Id.
at 91. Writing for the Court, Judge Gleeson, a District Court judge sitting by designation, noted:
a check-a-box section of the form, which was checked by the district court in this case,
invites sentencing judges to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range
simply because the judge finds no reason to depart. Because that both undermines the
statutory obligation to state the reasons for every sentence and unlawfully presumes the
reasonableness of the advisory Guidelines range, the form should be amended.
Id. The case is thus also an example of the two-way relationship between the Sentencing Commission and federal judges, as the latter at times make recommendations to the former within written
opinions.
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perhaps the most unlikely, especially given the more conservative make-up
of today’s Court with the addition of new Justice Neil Gorsuch, who in his
first few months on the bench has “asserted his exceptionally conservative
views early and often across a dizzying range of hot-button issues.”196 Despite the unlikeliness of it occurring, it is worthwhile to briefly outline how
an advocate might attempt to rely on the Pepper decision in an attempt to at
least argue to the Supreme Court that it direct lower courts to disregard Section 5H1.6.
As discussed above, in its Pepper decision, the Court affirmed a district
court’s downward departure based on post-sentencing rehabilitation, despite
the existence of a federal statute and a Commission policy statement disfavoring consideration of such evidence at sentencing.197 As it did in the Pepper decision, the Court could hold that sentencing judges are free to disregard
Section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines, since the Court’s “post-Booker decisions
make clear that a district court may in appropriate cases impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s views. That
is particularly true where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly
unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing statutes Congress enacted.”198
Just as the Court in Pepper carefully dissected the proffered rationales
behind the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement by attacking the commentary provided for the relevant section,199 so too could the Court do this
for Section 5H1.6. The commentary on that section provides in part that “the
fact that the defendant’s family might incur some degree of financial hardship
or suffer to some extent from the absence of a parent through incarceration is
not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure because such hardship or suffering is of a sort ordinarily incident to incarceration.”200 The Court could
instead focus on the facts that defendant’s families frequently face more than
“some degree of financial hardship” and that children suffer more than “to

196. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Neil Gorsuch Delivering as Trump’s Promised Conservative,
CNN (June 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/26/politics/justice-neil-gorsuch-presidenttrump-gets-his-man/index.html (quoting interview with Joshua Matz, former clerk to Justice Anthony Kennedy).
197. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
198. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 501 (2011) (citation omitted) (citing Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007)).
199. Id. at 501–04. The Commission had provided commentary stating “that departures based
on postsentencing rehabilitation would ‘(1) be inconsistent with the policies established by Congress
under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) [governing good time credit] and other statutory provisions for reducing
the time to be served by an imprisoned person; and (2) inequitably benefit only those who gain the
opportunity to be resentenced de novo.’” Id. at 501 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.19 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2010)). The Court rejected both of those
rationales. Id. at 501–04.
200. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
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some extent” when a parent is incarcerated. The Court could thus conclude,
as it did in Pepper, that “a district court may in appropriate cases impose a
non-Guidelines sentence based on a disagreement with the Commission’s
views”201 as laid out in Section 5H1.6, since the Commission’s views there
“rest on wholly unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing
statutes Congress enacted.”202 Again, though, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would reach such a holding, especially with the addition of Justice Gorsuch.
3. Requirement of a Family Impact Statement
Scholars have called for an amendment of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to include a “family impact assessment,” which would “include
information about a defendant’s family and the impact a potential sentence
might have on the family.”203 Such an amendment is procedurally cumbersome204 and politically unlikely.205 Although there is precedent for Congress
to demand the inclusion of impact statements in presentence investigation
reports,206 and while this Article will briefly explore what such an amendment
would look like in practice, once again this particular strategy is unlikely to
come to fruition, at least through a formal amendment of the Rules. Even
though it is unlikely that there will be a wholesale shift here, there is still a
way for individual judges to mandate the inclusion of such statements in their
own courtrooms.
In 2009, the San Francisco Adult Probation Department began to incorporate Family Impact Statements into the presentence investigation reports
they prepared before each defendant’s sentencing.207 The goal of the Family

201. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 501.
202. Id.
203. Andersen, supra note 70, at 1533–34; see also Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe
to Include Considerations of the Effects on Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73, 114 (2014) (“[S]ection 3552 of title 18 of the United States Code,
governing presentence investigation reports, should be amended at paragraph (B) to require that a
part of the presentence report would include a new ‘Family Impact Statement.’”).
204. See supra note 171
205. See supra note 169.
206. For example, in 1982, Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–15, 3579–80 (2012)),
which mandated inclusion of victim impact statements in noncapital sentencing reports for federal
crimes. Specifically, that law requires presentence investigation reports to include “(C) information
concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss
suffered by any victim of the offense; and (D) any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including the restitution needs of any victim of the offense.” Victim and Witness Protection
Act § 3.
207. Wendy S. Still, San Francisco Realignment: Raising the Bar for Criminal Justice in California, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 246, 247–48 (2013).
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Impact Statements is to insure that sentencing judges have access to information about how a sentence of incarceration might impact the defendant’s
children and how best to protect family ties.208 These statements were modeled after “environmental impact statements,”209 which are prepared by federal agencies before they undertake any action that could significantly affect
the environment.210 The Family Impact Statements “focus on the sentenced
person’s family details, such as the number of children, the children’s living
situation, the person’s relationship to the caregiver, status as a primary caregiver, and the county where the children reside.”211
The use of Family Impact Statements is still relatively low, and only a
handful of states are currently implementing them.212 But states that have
adopted the practice, even on a trial basis, have reported encouraging results.
In New York State, for example, the criminal justice advocacy group, The
Osborne Association, worked with state probation professionals to urge probation officers to incorporate Family Impact Statements into their pre-sentencing investigation reports.213 The Osborne Association worked alongside
probation officers in a collaborative manner, rather than attempting to create
change through legislative channels.214 The initiative encountered some resistance, including resistance from those who “were concerned that [Family
Impact Statements] would prioritize the defendant’s family circumstances
over the victim’s family circumstances, thereby eclipsing the statutorily required Victim Impact Statement.”215 By working collaboratively with probation officers, the Osborne Association was able to overcome this initial

208. Id.
209. Margaret diZerega, San Francisco’s Family-Focused Probation: A Conversation with
Chief Adult Probation Officer Wendy Still, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 54, 54 (2011).
210. Peter Olasky, Crime Impact Statements, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 329, 349–50
(2004). Environmental impact statements are required at the federal level by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which “requires that before a federal agency undertakes an ‘action’ that
could significantly affect the environment, the agency must prepare and publicize a detailed statement outlining the environmental impact of the proposed action as well as alternatives.” Id. (citing
40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12–.16 (2003)).
211. diZerega, supra note 209, at 54 (citing CAROL LIU, FACT SHEET: SENATOR LIU, FAMILY
IMPACT STATEMENT (2010)).
212. See THE OSBORNE ASS’N, FAMILY IMPACT STATEMENTS: CONSIDERING THE NEEDS OF
CHILDREN 2 (2012) (noting that as of 2012, only courts in San Francisco, Arkansas, and Tennessee
used Family Impact Statements).
213. Allison Hollihan, Garnering Support for Policy Change: Family Impact Statement,
JUSTICE STRATEGIES (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.justicestrategies.org/coip/blog/2015/02/garnering-support-policy-change-family-impact-statement.
214. Id. (“While state legislation or regulatory reform would be required to add a stand-alone
[Family Impact Statement] section to pre-sentencing investigation reports, it is not needed to include
such information into the existing report format.”).
215. Id. Indeed, the group ultimately chose to rename the statements to “Family Responsibility
Statements.” Id.
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resistance, and Family Impact Statements are now highlighted as a “best
practice” in Office of Probation and Correctional Alternatives training for all
new probation officers in New York.216
In order to make Family Impact Statements mandatory for inclusion in
federal presentence investigation reports, an amendment to Rule 32 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (which requires the reports) would be
required. Specifically, there would need to be an amendment to Rule 32(d),
which currently requires that the presentence investigation report include
“the defendant’s history and characteristics,” “information that assesses any
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any victim,” and
“when appropriate, the nature and extent of nonprison programs and resources available to the defendant.”217 The amendment could track the language already provided about impact on victims and, thus, could require that
the presentence investigation report contain “information that assesses any
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on the defendant’s family, especially any minor children.”
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS THAT ARE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED
The preceding Part is rather depressing, as it concludes time and time
again that certain avenues for addressing the issues experienced by children
of incarcerated parents are likely foreclosed, and will remain foreclosed for
some time in the future. But not all is lost. First, there is an alternative way
that individual district court judges could mandate the use of Family Impact
Statements in their courtrooms, even absent a formal amendment of Rule 32,
and this Article makes the unique case for it here. Second, there are certain
modest but impactful policy shifts that individual states or even prisons could
adopt that would support meaningful visitation between incarcerated parents
and their children, and this visitation is a powerful protection against many
of the harms associated with parental incarceration.

By emphasizing the defendant’s parenting responsibilities, rather than the impact on their
children, we garnered buy-in from those who expressed concern about eclipsing the victim impact statement or who were not overly-empathetic about potential impacts on children (e.g., ‘the parent should have thought of the children before committing the crime’).
Furthermore, by simply changing the name to Family Responsibility Statement, people
were less likely to conflate Victim Impact Statements and Family Impact Statements.
Id.
216. Id.
217. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)–(C).
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A. Using Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 32(d)(2)(G) to
Require the Inclusion of Family Impact Statements in Presentence
Investigation Reports
Currently, Rule 32(d)(2)(G) requires that the presentence investigation
report include “any other information that the court requires, including information relevant to the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”218 This language
was included as part of the 2007 Rule 32 amendments that were undertaken
in the wake of the Booker decision.219 According to the commentary included
with that amendment, the language in subsection (d)(2)(G) “contemplates
that a request can be made either by the court as a whole requiring information affecting all cases or a class of cases, or by an individual judge in a
particular case.”220
Research did not yield a single example of a judge using this subsection
to require anything resembling a family impact statement. Rather, the few
citations to this subsection of the Rule have pertained to matters other than
family ties, such as to support the inclusion of an unproven allegation that the
defendant sexually abused a child,221 or to justify a refusal of a district court
judge to recuse herself from a case at sentencing.222 But in one remarkable,
recent opinion out of the Eastern District of New York, Senior District Court
Judge Frederic Block relied on Rule 32(d)(2)(G) to require the probation department to include a summary of all federal collateral consequences faced
by the defendant, and noted that “[t]he Probation Department should include
a collateral-consequences section in all future pre-sentence reports.”223 Because this groundbreaking opinion could provide a roadmap for judges to
similarly mandate the inclusion of Family Impact Statements, it is worth exploring more fully here.
In United States v. Nesbeth,224 the defendant had been found guilty, after
a jury trial, of importation of cocaine with intent to distribute, resulting in an
218. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(G). The Section 3553(a) factors include the kinds of sentences
available, any pertinent policy statements, and the history and characteristics of the defendant. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
219. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, 2007 amend. cmt.
220. Id. Note that as of the time of those amendments, the language was found in subsection
(d)(2)(F), not (d)(2)(G). Id. In the 2011 amendments, the language was renumbered subdivision
(d)(2)(G) for “stylistic purposes.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, 2011 amend. cmt.
221. United States v. Bartlett, 416 F. App’x 508, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2011).
222. United States v. Mitchell, No. 13–cr–00538, 2014 WL 3735266, at *1 (D.N.J. July 29,
2014) (denying defendant’s motion for recusal in response to sentencing judge’s request to probe
for more information on defendant’s finances). In Mitchell, the sentencing judge noted that Rule
32(d)(2)(G) recognizes the judge’s right and obligation to “seek[] additional information pursuant
to its duty to consider all relevant information and to ensure the accuracy of the PSR [presentence
investigation report] prior to fashioning a sentence.” Id. at *5.
223. United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
224. 188 F. Supp. 3d 179.
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advisory guidelines range of thirty-three to forty-one months of incarceration.225 Judge Block departed and issued a non-incarceratory sentence of one
year of probation, “in part because of a number of statutory and regulatory
collateral consequences [the defendant would] face as a convicted felon.”226
Recognizing the significance of such a decision, Judge Block wrote a lengthy
opinion that is part scholarly article and part sentencing memorandum. He
began by tracing the history of collateral consequences in this country, including post-conviction statutory and regulatory collateral consequences.227
He then turned to the governing case law and arrived at his sentence, factoring in the collateral consequences the defendant would face and balancing of
all Section 3553(a) factors.228 Finally, he included a section on the responsibilities of counsel and the Probation Department with respect to collateral
consequences.229
The opinion is sweeping in its reach and rather astonishing in its scope,
and it garnered a fair amount of media attention.230 Although the defendant
in Nesbeth did not have children, and so Judge Block did not have occasion
to speak on the impact of parental incarceration as a form of “collateral consequence,” he did note in dicta that incarceration can cause parents to lose
custody of their children, amongst other harms, and that, “[i]n this way, the
statutory and regulatory scheme contributes heavily to many ex-convicts becoming recidivists and restarting the criminal cycle.”231 Judge Block ended
his opinion by declaring, in part because of Rule 32(d)(2)(G), that “it is the
obligation of both the defense lawyer and the prosecutor, as well as the Probation Department in the preparation of its [presentence investigation report],
to assess and apprise the court, prior to sentencing, of the likely collateral
consequences facing a convicted defendant.”232

225. Id. at 180.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 180–86.
228. Id. at 186–96.
229. Id. at 196–98.
230. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Judge’s Striking Move in Felony Drug Case: Probation,
Not Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/nyregion/in-a-striking-move-brooklyn-judge-orders-probation-over-prison-in-felony-drug-case.html (noting that the
Nesbeth opinion has been called “groundbreaking”); Lincoln Caplan, Why a Brooklyn Judge Refused to Send a Drug Courier to Prison, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-a-brooklyn-judge-refused-to-send-a-drug-courier-to-prison (describing the opinion as “cutting-edge”). Not all of the press was favorable. See,
e.g., Lia Eustachewich, Woman Gets off Easy for Smuggling $45k Worth of Cocaine, N.Y. POST
(May 25, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/05/25/woman-gets-off-easy-for-smuggling-45k-of-cocaine/ (describing the opinion and sentence as “a big break” for the defendant).
231. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 185 (footnotes omitted) (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW 97, 142–58 (2010)).
232. Id. at 197.
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The Government did not appeal the Nesbeth decision, and thus, neither
the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court have weighed in on the ideas (and
ideals) Judge Block outlined there. However, despite the opinion being only
eighteen months old, it has already been cited to dozens of times by other
judges, defense attorneys, and scholars.233 Mandating a Family Impact Statement that required the probation department to include information about
how an incarceratory sentence would impact a defendant’s children is just as
squarely within a judge’s power under Rule 32(d)(2)(G) as a statement on
collateral consequences. Federal district court judges who are concerned
about this issue and do not want to wait for action from Congress, the Supreme Court, or the Sentencing Commission, have a tool already at their disposal for mandating the inclusion of Family Impact Statements.
B. Improving Prison Visitation Policies
As discussed above, frequent and high-quality visitation has been shown
to benefit both children and incarcerated parents, as well as society at large
through lowered recidivism rates. Visitation policies, however, frequently
deter families from visiting. Restrictive visitation policies that deter children
from visiting “flow from cultural and institutional beliefs that incarcerated
individuals, including parents, do not deserve privileges such as family visitation.”234 Indeed, some states have visitation policies that single out children.
For example, New Hampshire prohibits all toys in the visiting room and
warns that “visits will be terminated if children are allowed to misbehave or
become out of control.”235
Prison visitation policies can be dizzying in their scope and uneven in
their application. At a recent listening session hosted by the Federal Interagency Reentry Council’s Subgroup on Children of Incarcerated Parents, a
young woman recounted her story of being turned away at the door of her
father’s prison after having traveled for a long distance because she had violated the prison’s dress code.236 Her violation? She was wearing blue, which
was associated as a gang color.237 Visitor dress codes can be mind-bogglingly specific; in the state of Tennessee, for example, visitors must wear
undergarments but must not wear “inappropriate” undergarments such as

233. See, e.g., United States v. Jaime, 235 F. Supp. 3d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (relying on
Nesbeth to sentence a defendant to pre-judgment probation); see also supra note 230 (collecting
news reports on Nesbeth).
234. Parke & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 51.
235. N.H. DEP’T OF CORR. POLICY & PROCEDURE DIRECTIVE 7.09.IV.I.3 (2017),
https://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/policies/documents/7-09.pdf.
236. YOUTH.GOV, supra note 33.
237. Id.
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“thongs and water brassieres.”238 They are also prohibited from wearing
“spandex or spandex-type fabrics,”239 “worn or tattered clothing,”240 and
“clothing with logos that contain pictures.”241 As any parent of a toddler can
attest, children’s clothing frequently contains logos with pictures.
Amending prison visitation policies so that they are more family
friendly and more encouraging of visits from children is relatively low hanging fruit for improving the experiences of children of incarcerated parents.
The specific series of recommendations that follow are modest, cost little to
implement, and have already been proven successful in certain states and districts.
1. Policies Should Explicitly Promote Visits by Children
Prison visitation policies should explicitly promote visits by minor children in a welcoming fashion. Washington State’s Department of Corrections
is a leader in this area. Its prison visitation policy clearly provides that “[t]he
Department will provide visiting opportunities and programs and a secure
and welcoming visit space for offenders and their families to provide as normal a family experience as possible.”242 Rather than viewing children as an
afterthought, or being openly hostile to their presence by banning toys or diaper bags, the Washington policy provides that “[d]esignated visit areas
should include a section that has a child-friendly environment with toys and
games suitable for interaction by family members of all ages,”243 and that
“[s]pace may be provided for the proper storage of visitors’ coats, handbags,
and other personal items not allowed into the visiting area.”244 The policy
recognizes that young, minor children should be treated differently than other
visitors, and provides that “[i]n addition to brief, appropriate contact at the
beginning of each visit, an offender may have physical contact with his/her
child(ren) 8 years of age and under.”245 Physical contact with an incarcerated
parent is especially important for very young children, and “the lack of contact visitation in most local jails creates serious problems for newborns and
infants who do, in fact, crave their parent’s touch.”246
238. TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMIN. POLICIES & PROCEDURES 507.01.VI.M.1.b (2017),
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/correction/documents/507-01.pdf.
239. Id. at VI.M.2.a.
240. Id. at VI.M.2.f.
241. Id. at VI.M.2.g.
242. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. POLICY 450.300.I.A (2016), http://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/showFile.aspx?name=450300.
243. Id. at 450.300.I.A.1.a.
244. Id. at 450.300.I.A.1.e.
245. Id. at 450.300.VII.D.
246. See generally Megan McMillen, Note, I Need to Feel Your Touch: Allowing Newborns and
Infants Contact Visitation with Jailed Parents, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1852 (2012).
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The overall tone of the Washington policy as it relates to children is one
of welcome, and this is reflected in the directive the policy provides to employees who oversee these visits, which reiterates “the importance of visiting
to maintain ties with family and friends, and in some cases reunification of
offenders with their families and significant others.”247 Prisons can and
should have policies that promote safety while also promoting the maintenance of family ties and visitation for children.
2. Visitation Hours Should Be Extended
Prisons should review their visitation hours to be sure they are as convenient and open as possible. Too often, visitation hours are scheduled only,
or predominantly, during working hours, and this further deters children (who
under policy must be accompanied by adults) from being able to visit their
incarcerated parents. States and cities that have addressed this issue have
been able to make meaningful changes. For example, the San Francisco Children of Incarcerated Parents Partnership248 “worked with the[ir local] sheriff’s department to improve the visiting policies” in prisons there, and focused specifically on increasing visiting hours.249 As a result of that
partnership, “opportunities for parent-child visits increased to 32.5 hours per
week in 2011 from 11.5 hours per week in 2007.”250
3. Partnerships with Nonprofits Should Be Explored
Prisons should work with local nonprofits to support opportunities for
children to have free transportation to prisons on selected visitation days.
Because parents are frequently incarcerated far from their minor children, the
costs (both in terms of dollars and time) of attempting to visit are often quite
high.251 Several nonprofits have stepped up to try to help families who wish

247. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. POLICY 450.300.I.A.2 (2017).
248. The San Francisco Children of Incarcerated Parents Partnership (“SFCIPP”) “is a coalition
of social service providers, representatives of government bodies, advocates and others who work
with or are concerned about children of incarcerated parents and their families.” Frequently Asked
Questions, SFCIPP, http://www.sfcipp.org/faqs (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
249. Richard A. Webster & Jonathan Bullington, How to Break the ‘Generational Curse’ That
Keeps Communities in Fear, Poverty, TIMES PICAYUNE (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2017/01/new_orleans_parental_incarcera_1.html.
250. Id.
251. An excellent example of this is provided in Boudin et al., supra note 50, at 179. Boudin
writes:
For a mother and child living in New York City whose husband and father is incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility in upstate New York, it would take six hours to drive
to the prison. Without a car, the journey by bus may be difficult to schedule. In addition
to transportation costs, once at Attica, the mother and child would need to pay for food
and accommodations. Depending on Attica’s rules and whether there is an unforeseen
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to visit but cannot afford the trip. For example, each year, the Center for
Restorative Justice Works hosts its “Get on the Bus” event, which provides
free transportation for children to visit their parents who are incarcerated in
California.252 The program attempts to make the child’s visit more comfortable and meaningful, providing the children with travel bags and meals, and
also with post-event counseling on the ride home (along with a teddy bear
and a letter from their incarcerated parent).253
These programs not only alleviate the financial burden of visiting, they
also normalize the experience in a way that reduces stigma, as all of the other
children on the bus are going to visit an incarcerated parent as well. The
event also helps make the visits more family friendly. For example, during
a Get on the Bus trip to San Quentin for Father’s Day last year, the itinerary
for the visit included face painting and temporary tattoos.254 The Center for
Restorative Justice Works operates the program in conjunction with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.255 All prison systems
should be open to such partnerships, and indeed should actively seek them
out.
V. CONCLUSION
“Men are not prisoners of fate, but only prisoners of their own
minds.”256
Children of incarcerated parents have done nothing wrong. They have
broken no laws, they have violated no rules. Still, they are punished. They
serve their parents’ sentences alongside them, innocent and often hidden victims. It is beyond time for judges and policy makers to consider these children when fashioning a sentence or setting policy such as prison visitation
rules. Although the current Republican-controlled Congress and the Trump
Administration may not prioritize changes to the Sentencing Guidelines or

lockdown (eliminating all visits) or other interruption, the mother and child are not guaranteed to see their husband and father. In sum, for the mere possibility of a short visit
with their husband and father, the mother and child would likely have to spend several
hundred dollars and commit at least two days.
Id.
252. Who We Are, CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE WORKS, http://www.crjw.us/programs/geton-the-bus/who-we-are/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018).
253. Id.
254. Families Visit San Quentin Inmates for Father’s Day, MARIN INDEP. J. (June 17, 2016),
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would benefit children of incarcerated parents, there are still changes that individual judges or prison policy
officials can undertake now. These children deserve our attention and the
modest changes outlined here should be considered only the beginning of
what we can do.

